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BOOK REVIEWS 
Philosophy and the Christian Faith by Thomas V. Morris, editor. Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. xiv + 300 pp. $3l.95, 
cloth; $12.95, paper. 
JAMES WM. MCCLENDON, JR., Church Divinity School of the Pacific, 
Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley. 
This volume represents an important tendency in the philosophy of religion. 
It makes a turn away from problems in 'the philosophy of religion' as that 
discipline was invented by Hume (Dialogues; Natural History) and Kant (the 
Critiques and Religion within the Limits), and brings philosophical skills once 
again to bear upon the intrinsic thought problems of the way of life shared 
by Christian believers. This collection deserves to be judged as such a bell-
wether (rather than merely for the sterling merits of some of its essays), and 
it is in that role that I will try to appraise it here. It will come out that 
individual philosophers, in adjusting to the new demands, have retained pre-
occupations more attuned to the old, or have not sufficiently appreciated the 
changed world in which they work. But it will also come out that almost 
despite itself, Philosophy and the Christian Faith signals a definitive turn in 
contemporary philosophy of religion. 
The editor, Thomas V. Morris, generated the volume by promoting a con-
ference at the University of Notre Dame. Morris believes that metaphysics, 
natural theology, and "cognitive propositional theology" (George Lindbeck's 
term) have never been refuted by modern thinkers such as Hume and Kant. 
Since respected academic theologians have nevertheless taken this modernity 
as definitive for their task, Morris sees the Christian philosophical challenge 
to be the recovery of "theological realism" instantiated in the "classical 
Christian doctrines" (pp. 4f.). Lindbeck (The Nature of Doctrine) has supposed 
without adequate argument that Christian doctrines as such are 'grammatical' 
rules governing Christian discourse. Morris sees Lindbeck as a reductionist, and 
intends by presenting these essays (in tandem with his Logic of God Incarnate) 
to defend instead a cognitive-propositional view of doctrine. 
If this account of the editor's purpose is accurate, his view of the signifi-
cance of this collection differs from that of the reviewer. The editor believes 
that Hume and Company failed, and so believing philosophers must (if theo-
logians will not) resume the interrupted doctrinal task. My beliefs about the 
role of Hume and Company are too complex to present here, but I, too, think 
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it is time to resume the doctrinal task, and think philosophers can help. Only 
the new task will necessarily be different, because it will be a postmodern 
one. So both the editor and the present reviewer turn away from modernity. 
The editor reverts to the premodern; the reviewer (and George Lindbeck) turn 
to the postmodern. Whether the essays under review fulfill the editor's project 
or the reviewer's (or, by remaining 'modern,' fulfill neither) remains to be 
ascertained. 
All the essays address doctrinal or moral themes in Christian theology, and 
all but one (Ross's) are interested primarily in doctrinal content rather than 
justification or backing. Most develop one or another aspect of soteriology, 
the doctrine of salvation, but one treats suffering as an aspect of God's love 
and human love, while another is on the Trinity. To particularize: Richard 
Swinburne (Oxford) writes about the "Christian Scheme of Salvation"; he 
intends to show how the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ have 
made salvation available, i.e., to set forth a theory of atonement. This theory 
turns out to be Anselmic, though with a Grotian twist at the end. William 
Wainwright (Wisconsin-Milwaukee) discusses "Original Sin," providing an 
exposition and critique of Jonathan Edwards' version of that doctrine: only 
those features of the doctrine that are implied by God's offer of grace should 
be retained. Eleonore Stump (Virginia Polytechnic) writes on "Atonement 
According to Aquinas." She presents a popular version of atonement theory 
and shows it to be a debased version of a more coherent account. While she 
bases the latter on Aquinas, her restatement owes much to Abelard. Marilyn 
McCord Adams (UCLA) offers a straightforward biblical study, "Separation 
and Reversal in Luke-Acts," designed to show that Luke-Acts steers a middle 
course between (on the one hand) the melodramatic salvation history of early 
apocalyptic and (on the other) theological universalism with its concept of a 
God who has nothing to lose. William Alston (Syracuse) writes on "The 
Indwelling of the Holy Spirit"; he attempts to say how the Spirit modifies a 
believer's life in order to make it more christlike. Steering between a mere 
"fiat" model and a mere "communication" model, he opts for a "sharing" 
model in which the barriers between self and Spirit are increasingly broken 
down in the course of Christian practice. Robert Merrihew Adams (UCLA) 
explores "Christian Liberty." Even from the standpoint of the modified divine 
command theory of ethics it is possible to construe the Christian moral life 
as more than simple obedience to God's prior choices for us, provided we 
construe that life partly along aesthetic lines. The woman who poured oint-
ment on Jesus' head has done a "beautiful" thing. In "Warring Against the 
Law of My Mind: Aquinas on Romans 7," Norman Kretzmann (Cornell) 
explores the theory of human nature implied there by Paul. The Apostle's 
professed inability to do what he wills to do is attributed by Aquinas to the 
moral trouble that is "part of the human condition"; namely, that even re-
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deemed people are sometimes controlled by a "fomes" or spark of unreason 
within human nature. But if so, their action then is not human action (since 
for Aquinas humanity is defined by "reasonable"). Nicholas Wolterstorff(Cal-
vin and Amsterdam), pursuing a long and subtle exploration of "Suffering 
Love," argues that to attribute impassibility to God is a mistake, being based 
on a Stoic not a biblical model; he concludes that suffering love is a necessary 
and costly part of God's being and is meant to be part of our own. This forces 
a revision of the low Augustinian estimate of the value of life in this present 
world. Peter van Inwagen (Syracuse) treats the doctrine of the Trinity sum-
marized in the (so-called) Athanasian Creed: "And Yet They Are Not Three 
Gods But One God." Relative-identity logic permits a coherent formal state-
ment of that doctrine. James Ross (Pennsylvania) writes on "Eschatological 
Pragmatism," arguing that the truth of Christian teaching about the "Second 
Coming," etc., consists in "cognitive consonance" between the believer's 
current belief and cognition "in the end." He defends this view by a brief but 
complex analysis of various sorts of "truth-making" claims, and finds that in 
this case the relevant consonance is compatible with a wide set of present 
Christian imaginings (as well as of unimaginable beliefs). 
If theology and philosophy are indeed two disciplines not one, then when 
philosophers set out to do theology they are in a sense (but not a pejorative 
sense) amateurs, and it is interesting to see what light these learned theolog-
ical amateurs have shed on the theological task. It is difficult to see that any 
one philosophical ski1\ or tendency governs all the work. Marilyn Adams' 
biblical study does not depend upon her philosophical skills; Bill Alston's 
piece seems (to me) to presuppose no philosophical bias whatever. Certainly, 
from essay to essay one detects characteristic bits of skill or presupposition, 
some more common than others. Peter van Inwagen makes extensive use of 
symbolic logic; William Wainwright and Bob Adams presume their own or 
others' work in philosophical ethics; Jim Ross deploys current epistemology. 
In the end I failed to find the heavy employment of metaphysics that Thomas 
Morris's introduction had led me to expect, and I believe that David Hume, 
were he to read the book, would find fuel for his philosophical flames only 
in those few places in the essays that not only refer to, but seem also to 
presuppose, the assumptions of medieval theologians (see especially Swin-
burne, Stump, and Kretzmann), while all the essayists engage those "matters 
of fact" and "abstract reasoning" that Hume positively defended. 
In fact, the philosophers in this collection seem to me to treat their chosen 
doctrines very much as many present day theologians would. Today atone-
ment theories are widely seen to fall into three main classes or groups: those 
that see Christ's work aimed at God (or God the Father), those that see it as 
aimed at man-the-sinner, and those that see it aimed at evil and its powers 
(or at the devil). The modern period saw a shift from 'Godward' to 'manward' 
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(or Abelardian) theories, and the 20th century witnessed a renewal of 
'evilward' theories (Au len, Yoder). The atonement theorists in this volume 
(Swinburne and Stump) both begin with classic Godward theories, but the 
changes they propose reflect the 'manward' shift that marked 19th century 
theologians such as Schleiermacher and Bushnell. Again, Wainwright's dis-
cussion of original sin modifies Edwards in just the directions that character-
ize modern theology generally, where the original doctrine of original sin 
with its inherited guilt is (and ought to be) in a lot of trouble. 
Why is this so? Why do these philosopher-theologians, Americans most, 
Christians of independent judgment and obvious intellectual gifts, tend to-
ward the 'liberal' theological drift of recent centuries, despite their express 
conservative intent? I think the answer can be first seen by noting a method 
most of them share-that of explanatory examples drawn from contemporary 
common life. For example, Swinburne invokes a case of personal injury (your 
best vase broken), while Stump weaves in the story of "Susan and David." 
But, without naming the characters in their respective episodes, the same 
thing is done by Alston (e.g., p. 134) and Bob Adams (p. 169), and Kretzmann 
(p. 175), and Wolterstorff (p. 224), and Ross (p. 286). If asked why they 
employ such examples, I think most of these philosophers would say it is to 
make their concepts clear-concepts of guilt, or sharing, or freedom, or 
passion, or self-awareness, or 'fit.' I do not reject the practice; indeed, it is 
my own. I only note that by thus anchoring concepts in present-day life, we 
inevitably give them a contemporary coloring-which means they will do 
contemporary work but perhaps fail to do other work. Consider the difference 
between anchoring our concepts in contemporary stories versus anchoring 
them in biblical ones, though of course the contrast can't be a black and white 
one, because the biblical stories themselves must be told in our language-
and thus depend heavily upon our own conceptual scheme. My point is this: 
the philosophers who write these doctrinal essays are willy nilIy so anchored, 
themselves, in modernity. When they set out to give theological accounts of 
themselves, even those who reject Hume and Kant and the entailed modernity 
will make themselves clear only by invoking a conceptual world that displays 
many of the features they wish to reject. No wonder their project partly fails 
to reach the editor's formal goal. Despite him, metaphysics is played down 
and matters of fact are played up. Despite him, doctrines come out looking 
as much like Lindbeckian rules as they do like Morrisian cognitive proposi-
tions. Despite him, the contributors, in the content of their doctrines, often 
sound as contemporary as contemporary theology itself. 
And yet something new is happening here, nevertheless. It is displayed not 
so much in the content of the doctrines explored as in the form in which they 
are explored. I have already referred to this in a general way: here philoso-
phers explore the particular contents of a faith, rather than laying down a pro-
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crustean bed of principles and then forcing the object of their religious desires 
into it. I would like to illustrate this point by examining briefly one sample 
essay-perhaps not the most impressive (is that Wolterstorff's?) or most 
persuasive (Wainwright's?), but one that clearly exhibits the contemporary 
features I find interesting. This is Peter van Inwagen's essay on the Trinity. 
As already mentioned, van Inwagen sets out to defend the classic, creedal 
doctrine he finds in the QUicunque Vult: God is one Being but three Persons. 
Van Inwagen's discovery, following some work of Peter Geach, is that the 
Trinitarian paradox can be resolved by restating the doctrine in the formal 
language of relative-identity logic. I will suggest that the structure of van 
Inwagen's paper has characteristic postmodern features, but before doing so 
let me concede that it also displays marks of premodern thinking. Van In-
wagen clearly intends to reaffirm the historic faith of the Christian church. 
The Trinity is an essential and not an optional doctrine of Christian faith. 
That Christian faith, as the pope has said, is no human invention. Faith is for 
van Inwagen prior to knowledge (pp. 242f.). He is deternlined with his traditiori 
to avoid both tritheism and modalism. Moreover, his doctrinal formulations seem 
almost naive: While he has heard that "person" in Trinitarian theology does not 
mean what it means in everyday English (as in fact it does not), he is content to 
brush this aside with a remarkably ahistorical quotation from Geach (p. 248). 
Thus if van Inwagen's essay does display postmodem tendencies, they will 
apparently be in some tension with his own theological predelictions. 
Now to the structure of the argument. There is a development within formal 
logic called relative-identity logic (RI-logic). One of the features of this logic 
is that predicates in its language cannot be "count-nouns," nouns that can be 
pluralized and can be modified by the indefinite article. Thus in this language 
one cannot say, "A is an apple"; one must instead say "For some B, A is the 
same apple as B" (pp. 248f.). The reason for the circumlocution will appear 
in due course. Once van Inwagen has laid down the vocabulary, formation 
rules, and rules of inference of RI, it appears that what he calls "classical 
identity" (a=b) has no role to play. It is necessary neither to acknowledge or 
to exclude its existence. Perhaps classical identity is a special case within a 
larger world of relative identities, much as Euclidian geometry is a special case 
in the world of geometries. Now the goal is near: if the Christian believer, having 
relinquished with RI language the old luxury of singular reference, can instead 
make do with relative singular reference (a substitution suggested by Russell), 
then ordinary referential English can successfully be translated into RI language. 
But in that language, as the reader anticipates, it is also possible to express 
without contradiction the principal theses of Trinitarian theology, and in the 
remainder of the paper, van Inwagen spells out this result. 
I note here three very broad, general features, one linguistic, one episte-
mological, and one metaphysical-ethical, that I believe underlie this exercise, 
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with some (tentative) evidence for each. The evidence (and thus the conclu-
sion) is necessarily tentative, for van Inwagen's is not an essay in the theory 
of language or epistemology or metaphysics or ethics. Nevertheless, like all 
intellectual work, it displays dimensions of each, and it may be that we can 
detect these features. 
First, what about the linguistic feature? The formal language, RI, in which 
van Inwagen elects to express his traditional faith is neither the word-object 
language of modern empiricism nor its contrary, the expressive language of 
modern subjectivism. RI language might instead be characterized as a rela-
tional language-one in which the meaning of each part is indeterminate 
apart from its relation to the other parts. The words we use, and what there 
is, are not connected by a word-thing correspondence only, far less by the 
mere connection of what we say to our inner dispositions or tendencies. 
Rather our words do their work by way of their partnership in a logical 
structure-in this case, RI-Iogic. Van Inwagen draws a useful analogy be-
tween applying RI-Iogic to the trinitarian doctrine of God and applying quan-
tum field theory to particle physics: how can electrons be both waves and 
particles? ("How can something be both a disturbance and a lump of stuff?") 
Physicists believed both were true, but could not say how they were until 
Dirac formulated quantum field theory (pp. 243f.). The illustration, though 
not novel, is apt; so consider the implied theory of language: Is what makes 
appropriate the application of quantum theory to particle physics (or the 
application of RI-Iogic to the Trinity) just the bare linguistic correspondence 
of modern empiricism, or the effluences of modern expressivism? Or is it not 
rather the adequacy of a relational structure of language (namely, quantum 
theory) to the 'world' of physics (or in the analogous case the adequacy of 
RI-Iogic to the 'world' of faith)? The question is not merely whether RI-Iogic 
(RI-Ianguage) is formally consistent, but whether it can tell us something 
about God. As van Inwagen puts it, "One man's 'showing how something can 
be both X and Y' is another man's 'constructing a formalism that allows you 
to treat something as both X and Y without getting into trouble ... ' As I read 
van Inwagen, he leans strongly to the former alternative; he is interested in 
RI-logic because it may count as "really having 'shown how something can 
be'" (p. 273, note 4, quoting Polkinghorne). 
The second broad feature, the epistemic, is closely related to the first, van 
Inwagen's epistemic principle being neither the bare coherences of RI-logic, 
nor merely the tradition of his church, but these in relation to one another 
and to what there is. He is not a fideist saying "the Church says it, I believe 
it, that settles it" or a rationalist who reserves all religious belief until it has 
been established by rigorous argument, but one who bases knowledge upon 
these (and perhaps other) elements in relation to one another. If this is 
correct, van Inwagen's theory of knowledge can be called (following Quine) 
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"wholistic": the truth of the parts is inseparable from the truth of the whole 
set of his beliefs and convictions. A clue here is van Inwagen's remark (p. 
253) that a chief interest of a logic such as RI is "such applications as it may 
have"; I take him to mean the interest or value arising from our knowing what 
is so by means of these applications. 
The third broad feature underlying the paper is metaphysical-ethical. Here 
there are more clues to van Inwagen's thinking. The first task in constructing 
RI-Iogic is to free its user from the employment of 'count-nouns' (such as 
"horse" or "god" -items that could be counted) that by their use commit the 
user to there being the things it counts. For van Inwagen this is a prophylactic 
measure: "If one says, 'The box weighs four pounds,' one does not lay oneself 
open to the following sort of ontological interrogation: 'Just what is a 
"pound"? What properties do these "pounds" have? You say the box weighs 
four of them; but how many of them are there (in all, I mean)?'" (p. 249). 
Yet this metaphysical caution does not signal any pervasive skepticism about 
our access to what there is. For example, the construction of RI-Iogic involves 
the consideration and rejection of a certain too-sweeping logical rule (the 
Proposed Rule). And van Inwagen explains that "in refusing to add the Pro-
posed Rule (or any restricted version of it) to RI-Iogic, we are in effect saying 
that each dominance sentence [a technical term of the logic] embodies 
a ... metaphysical thesis-one that ought not to be underwritten by the formal 
logic of relative identity" (p. 253). What is that mischievous metaphysical 
thesis? To put the matter over-simply, it is that as it is with anything (e.g., 
that if x is an apple, and green, and y is x, then y is a green apple also), so 
it is with everything (e.g., that if x is divine, and a Fatber, and y is x, then y 
must be not only divine, but a Father, not a Son or Spirit). In brief, what is, 
is generic; that is the mischievous thesis in four words. An alternative to the 
generic view of reality (so Alexander Blair has suggested to me) is a corporate 
view: On it, each member of the whole exists and functions exactly in and 
because of his or her relation to other members, and the whole is thus not the 
mere assembly of units, but is itself relationally constituted. Van Inwagen 
gives us a clue that his own metaphysics is of this corporate sort in his 
explication of Trinitarian doctrine itself. Indeed, he underlines the primacy 
of this metaphysical assumption: only if the love between the persons of the 
Godhead is real can there be a real destiny for the church constituted by her 
members' love one to another: "Vzta venturi saeculi is a corporate life ... the 
whole Body of Christ coming to be an undistorted image of God" (p. 242). 
Now since premodern and postmodern views of metaphysics and ethics 
both stand in contrast to the modern view, someone may think that here Peter 
van Inwagen tends rather toward editor Thomas Morris's "Introduction." But 
as metaphysics is an area of overlap between pre- and postmodern thinking, 
that is probably a matter that the clues and hints I have indicated cannot settle. 
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The point, as my wife Nancey Murphy and I have claimed in a preliminary 
way (see "Distinguishing Modern and Post modern Theologies," in April, 
1989, Modern Theology), is that relationality in the theory of language, who-
lism in epistemology, and a corporate metaphysics and ethics are together 
features that identify authentic postmodernism and distinguish it not only 
from premodernity, but also from the merely modern age now ending. That 
van Inwagen (and in varying degree other contributors to the Morris volume) 
should so naturally display some of these postmodern features is an impres-
sive fact. This is not to deny that all of them retain, as noted above, many 
'modern' features in their work, and that some retain premodern features as 
well. Perhaps most impressive is that almost to a man or woman they eschew 
one of the chief features of the modern age, its foundationalist appeals to one 
or another kind of unquestionable datum. Their attending instead to the par-
ticularities of Christian practice and its doctrines seems to me telling (though 
not decisive) evidence of this crucial shift. If so, that is good news for 
Christian faith in the world today and tomorrow. 
Divine Nature and Human Language, by William P. Alston. Essays in Phil-
osophical Theology. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989. Pp. 
xi and 279. Cloth $34.95; Paper $12.95. 
RICHARD SWINBURNE, Oxford University. 
This volume contains William Alston's main recent essays on the philosophy 
of religion, apart from those concerned with religious experience (the mate-
rial of which later he plans to incorporate into a book on that subject). Five 
of the present essays are concerned with religious language, how we can use 
words whose meaning is given by their application to mundane contexts, for 
talking about God. Alston holds that a functionalist account of such mental 
concept words as "knowledge" and "purpose" allows us to apply these words 
literally to God in virtue of the effects of his activity. Just as talking about 
human beliefs and purposes is talking about the causes of our public behavi-
our, according to the functionalist, so, according to Alston, talking about 
God's knowledge and purposes is talking about the causes in him of the 
effects in the world which he produces. That is so even if what divine knowl-
edge and purposes are in themselves is utterly different from what human 
knowledge and purposes are in themselves. Four further essays are concerned 
with God's nature. Alston espouses what I would regard as a basically clas-
sical doctrine of God, while denying some of the more extravagant backing 
which Aquinas provided for that doctrine-that God is not related to the 
world, is pure actuality, is identical with his properties, and is such that every 
